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  2Coeditor’s Foreword: 
Reflections on How Biographies of Individual Scholars Can Relate to a 
Science’s Biography 
by Paul A. Samuelson, Coeditor 
 
This book adds up to more than the sum of its parts.  When W. Somerset Maugham 
opined that "to know one country you must know two countries," he was saying in a 
different way that 1+1 can exceed 2.  Adam Smith and Allyn Young categorized this as 
"increasing returns to scale." 
 
When a discipline---economics, chemistry, or acupuncture---is in a dynamic stage of 
rapid growth, its up-front cyclists care little whether it was Newton or Leibniz who 
"invented" the calculus.  The economics profession is in such a dynamic stage of rapid 
growth, as made clear by the interviews in this book.  The book permits us to step back and 
view the whole of the field in a revealing context that otherwise is easily missed in the 
narrow focus of individual expert researchers.  Twenty-first century's go-getters in 
economics go whole hours ignoring what more John Bates Clark did for marginal 
productivity theorizing, than Johann Ludwig von Thünen had not already done.   
 
This helps explain the historical fact that the role in the graduate curriculum once 
played by "History of Economic Thought" has eroded down to a narrow cadre of learned 
experts.  An unearned snobbery ensues, as is well illustrated by Bernard Shaw's canard: 
“Those who can, do.  Those who can't, teach."  Good history of science deserves a non-zero 
weight in the university curriculum.  The dynamic growth in individual subfields of the 
economics profession needs to be supplemented by overviews of the whole, not just as the 
sum of its normally separated parts.  This book provides such a view of the whole of the 
modern field of economics and the connection of that whole with the life experiences of 
famous economists whose work was seminal to the field. 
 
Returning to the theme of how multiplicity of cases can be fruitful, let's test an alleged 
dictum of Socrates:  "The unexamined life is not worth living."  When I once read an 
excellent book about the principal philosophers, all the usual suspects were there: Spinoza, 
Kant, Hegel, Wittgenstein, Russell, ....  My inductive finding was that Socrates had it 
completely wrong.  An unhappier gaggle of misfits could hardly be imagined. Suicides 
abounded, melancholies persisted, celibacies and divorces competed for frequencies.  A 
vulgar explanation would nominate as a common cause that the study of philosophy 
destroys the joy of life.  Perhaps a better explanation would be that becoming an orphan 
early, or being born dyslexic, etc., predisposes one to choose philosophy over being a 
cheerful bartender.  Acquiring an objective and insightful overview of the whole in any area 
of understanding is important, but less easily and enjoyably acquired than the skills of a 
bartender. 
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directions have evolved in the manners evident from this book.  A major conservative 
economist once explained that a source of his antipathy to government traced back to the 
defeat of his southern ancestors by a larger north economy.  Here is a similar factoid.  Joan 
Robinson once wrote that her opposition to having the UK enter the European Market was 
due to the fact that she "had more friends in [Nehru's] India than on the continent."  Yes, it is 
a banality that personal piffle can affect ideology.  But can we take autobiographical 
judgments as most accurate judgments?  The Robinson I knew could well have thought back 
in the 1960s that her kind of post-Fabian socialism would flourish better in India than on the 
continent.  And, alas, she may have been right in so thinking.   
 
Published scientific research, by its very nature, is designed not to identify any 
personal motives of the authors.  In understanding what is in this revealing book, need we be 
concerned with the personal motives for the directions taken by these eminent economists?  
If so, is this interviews-format the best way to gain insight into those motives?   
 
I conclude with an unworthy hypothesis regarding past and present directions of 
economic research.  Sherlock Holmes said, "Cherchez la femme."  When asked why he 
robbed banks, Willie Sutton replied, "That's where the money is."  We economists do 
primarily work for our peers' esteem, which figures in our own self-esteem.  When post-
depression Roosevelt's New Deal provided exciting job opportunities, first the junior 
academic faculties moved leftward.  To get back ahead of their followers, subsequently the 
senior academic faculties shoved ahead of them.  As post-Reagan, post-Thatcher electorate 
turned rightward, follow the money pointed, alas, in only one direction.  So to speak, we eat 
our own cooking.   
 
We economists love to quote Keynes’s final lines in his 1936 General Theory --- for 
the reason that they cater so well to our vanity and self-importance.  But to admit the truth, 
madmen in authority can self-generate their own frenzies without needing help from either 
defunct or avant garde economists.  What establishment economists brew up is as often 
what the Prince and the Public are already wanting to imbibe.  We guys don’t stay in the 
best club by proffering the views of some past academic crank or academic sage. 
 
Indeed, this book adds up to more than the sum of its parts.  It provides a rare 
overview of the economics profession in a manner that reveals the relevancy of the personal 
motives and experiences of some of its leading modern contributors. 
  4Coeditor’s Preface: 
An Overview of the Objectives and Contents of the Volume 
By William A. Barnett
1 
 
Editor of the Cambridge University Press journal, Macroeconomic Dynamics, 
Editor of the Elsevier monograph series, International Symposia in Economic Theory and Econometrics, 
and Coeditor of this book 
This collection of interviews contains unique insights into the thinking of some of 
the world’s most important economists, whose work contributed to the evolution of 
modern economic thought.  What makes this collection so unusual is the source of these 
interviews.  They first were published in a highly regarded, peer-reviewed, Cambridge 
University Press journal, Macroeconomic Dynamics, of which I am Editor.  Publication 
in scientific peer-reviewed journals normally is subject to refereeing, which constrains 
authors to publish only what is deemed to be acceptable to the referees, associate editors, 
and editors of those journals.  These constraints do not permit casual, free-wheeling 
discussion of the sort more commonly found in the popular press.  But it is publication in 
those professional journals that is most highly regarded by scientists, since only 
publication in those journals has the stamp of approval of the profession, as being 
consistent with the rigorous standards of science.  Hence it is through publication in such 
journals that scientists speak to each other in a manner that commands the respect of their 
peers. 
To the layman, it may seem odd that even the world’s most famous Nobel Prize 
winners are not permitted to speak to their profession within scientific journals in a 
manner that is free from the constraints of peer review.  With recognition of this 
communication problem, I instituted an interview series within the journal, 
Macroeconomic Dynamics.
2  That journal never publishes more than one interview in 
any issue, since the journal is otherwise a rigorously refereed scientific journal.  But it 
has been made clear to the journal’s publisher, Cambridge University Press, that an 
interview is entirely a quotation and cannot be touched by referees, associate editors, 
copy editors, the publisher, or me.  It is a matter of freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press that quotations cannot be altered.   
From the startup of the journal, interviewers and interviewees have been informed 
that they can say whatever they want in these interviews, despite the fact that publication 
is within an otherwise peer-reviewed scientific journal.  As a result, the leaders of the 
                                                 
1 I wish to thank Bill Cooper, at the University of Texas at Austin, from whom I first got the idea for this 
book. 
2 Interviews of statisticians can be found in the journal, Statistical Science, and interviews of 
econometricians can be found in the journal, Econometric Theory.  But those interviews tend to focus on 
the more technical objectives of those two journals, rather than on the general evolution of economic 
thought. 
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whether personal, religious, or political.  Personal attacks; claims of unfairness or 
prejudice, of religious persecution, or of political oppression; and unvarnished strong 
statements about politicians, administrators, and public policy, while normally excluded 
from professional journals, are not excluded from these interviews.  Participants in an 
interview are free to put such matters “on the record.”  The nature of the fireworks 
contained in some of these interviews cannot be found in other professional economics 
journals.  Nothing is removed from those interviews by the journal’s editorial board or by 
Cambridge University Press, although in one interview, Cambridge University Press did 
replace an Anglo-Saxon expletive with the abbreviation “f---”. 
The participants in these interviews include eight Nobel Laureates --- Wassily 
Leontief, Robert Lucas, Franco Modigliani, Robert Solow, Milton Friedman, Paul 
Samuelson, Robert Aumann, and James Tobin; two central bank governors --- Paul 
Volcker (former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board) and Stanley Fischer (Governor 
of the Bank of Israel); and a Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors --- Martin 
Feldstein.  Robert Aumann won his Nobel Prize as this book was in preparation.  Some of 
the other participants in these interviews are high on most economists’ lists for possible 
future Nobel Prizes in Economics.  Despite the fame of the interviewers and 
interviewees, you will not find comparably candid insights into their lives and views 
anywhere else but in this book or in the original interviews in Macroeconomic 
Dynamics. 
The following equally important interviews, which have appeared in 
Macroeconomic Dynamics, are planned to be included in the anticipated volume 2 of this 
book, along with other important interviews that now are in process.  Each of the two 
books will be balanced in content to be comparably as informative and to reflect a broad 
spectrum of views of many of the world’s most influential economists. 
Allan Meltzer interviewed by Bennett McCallum  
 ( Macroeconomic Dynamics,  vol 2, no 2, 1998) 
Elhanan Helpman interviewed by Daniel Trefler  
 ( Macroeconomic Dynamics,  vol 3, no 4, 1999) 
William Brock interviewed by Michael Woodford  
 ( Macroeconomic Dynamics,  vol 4, no 1, 2000) 
Karl Shell interviewed by Steven Spear and Randall Wright  
 ( Macroeconomic Dynamics,  vol 5, no 5, 2001) 
Axel Leijonhufvud interviewed by Brian Snowdon  
 ( Macroeconomic Dynamics,  vol 8, no 1, 2004) 
Anna Schwartz interviewed by Edward Nelson  
 ( Macroeconomic Dynamics,  vol 8, no 3, 2004) 
Guillermo Calvo interviewed by Enrique Mendoza  
 ( Macroeconomic Dynamics,  vol 9, no 1, 2005) 
Assar Lindbeck interviewed by Thorvaldur Gylfason  
 ( Macroeconomic Dynamics,  vol 10, no 1, 2006). 
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one of the world’s leading authorities on the history of economic thought, E. Roy 
Weintraub.  Weintraub’s Introduction follows this abstract.  In addition, Paul Samuelson, 
who is a coeditor of this book, contributed the book’s thought-provoking Foreword, 
which precedes this Preface.
3  To emphasize the colorful nature of much that appears in 
these interviews and the unusual insights available herein, a few of the more striking 
statements are briefly quoted below.  These quotations are taken out of context and are no 
substitute for the full interviews, but are an indication of the unusual nature of this 
collection of important and fascinating interviews.  The cover design of this book is a 
painting produced by a famous Swedish economist and artist, Assar Lindbeck, who 
generously permitted us to reproduce his painting, “Overlappende generationer,” for this 
book’s cover. 
All of the interviews published in this book are reprinted in their entirety from the 
Macroeconomic Dynamics originals, although some of the photographs have been 
removed.  The following are a sample of some of the quotations and observations that can 
be found in this book. 
1.  Wassily Leontief interviewed by Duncan Foley:  Wassily Leontief, best known 
as the originator of the fundamental planning tool, input-output analysis, won the Nobel 
Prize in Economics in 1973, while a professor at Harvard University.  He was born in the 
Soviet Union.  The following quotations are indicative of the insights about his life and 
views that can be found in his interview. 
“Marx was not a very good mathematician.  He was always mixed up in math, and 
the labor theory of value didn’t make much sense.”  “I left the Soviet Union in 1925.  I 
got in trouble with the government, actually.”  “Richard Goodwin was my student....He 
couldn’t get tenure.  And this was the reason why he went to England...I think possible, it 
was politics.  He was on the left.” 
Regarding his views about the distant future, Leontief explains:  “I think problems 
of income distribution will increase in importance.  As I mentioned before, labor will be 
not so important, and the problem will be just to manage the system.  People will get 
their income allocated through social security---already now we get it through social 
security, and we try to invent pretexts to provide social security for people.  Here, I think, 
the role of the government will be incredibly important, and those economists who try to 
minimize the role of the government, I fear, show a superficial understanding of how the 
                                                 
3 In a letter to me, Paul Samuelson wrote that, “I never mind it when my prose targets the most erudite of 
those who read it.  Robert Browning said, ‘Ah, but a man’s reach should exceed his grasp, or what’s a 
heaven for?’”  In that context, Paul explained that his Foreword, “on purpose ... did not include the exact 
famous final words in The General Theory.”  Nevertheless, for the benefit of those who do not meet Paul’s 
high standards of erudition, I here provide Keynes (1936, pp. 383-384) statement, to which Paul alludes in 
his Foreword:  “Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, 
are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.  Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are 
distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.  I am sure that the power of vested 
interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas ... Sooner of later, it is 
ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.” 
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there would be complete chaos...it would be horrible.”   
Wassily Leontief died in 1999, a year after the publication of his interview in 
Macroeconomic Dynamics. 
2.  David Cass interviewed jointly by Steve Spear and Randall Wright:  David 
Cass has produced some of the deepest theoretical insights in the field of economics, 
including the discovery of “sunspot equilibria” in his joint research with Karl Shell.  
Cass, along with Hirofumi Uzawa and Karl Shell, has influenced economic dynamics in 
ways that have been pivotal in the history of economic thought.  In keeping with that 
depth of intellect, this interview is uncompromising in its emphasis on technical advances 
in economics.  Although his time on the faculty of Carnegie Mellon University 
overlapped with mine, as a graduate student there, one of my disappointments was that he 
did not stay.  He moved to the University of Pennsylvania, for reasons made clear in this 
interview.   
There is another more colorful side to Cass.  That side is well known in the 
profession and clearly displayed in this interview by such statements as the following:  
“We had to hire a new dean.  At Carnegie, the faculty was very involved in this 
process....we settled on Arnie Weber...That turned out to be, from Carnegie’s viewpoint 
and my own viewpoint, a disaster ... Arnie called me into his office for some reason, and I 
had an interview with him.  He told me that I was a luxury good and that I didn’t do 
business.  I did theoretical economics and it wasn’t something that business schools 
could really support, and he did it in a very obnoxious way that really pissed me off.  And 
I said ‘f--- you, Arnie.’... Yeah, I said ‘f--- you.’” 
Cass said the following about Nobel Laureate Robert Lucas, who was on the faculty 
at Carnegie Mellon University at that time, “Bob was in the Chicago tradition and was 
very concerned about empirical testing --- whatever the hell that means --- something 
that I have little sympathy for and very little interest in, to be perfectly honest.”  
Although himself a pioneer in real business cycle theory via the Cass-Koopmans model, 
Cass said, “the thing about real business-cycle theory, I suppose, is that it is almost like a 
religion.” 
3.  Robert E. Lucas interviewed by Bennett T. McCallum:  Robert Lucas won the 
Nobel Prize in Economics in 1995, while a professor at the University of Chicago.  In his 
introduction to this interview, Bennett T. McCallum wrote that “Bob Lucas is widely 
regarded as the most influential economist of the past 25-30 years, at least among those 
working in macro and monetary economics.” 
In this interview, you will learn how Lucas was motivated at age of 7 or 8 to be 
interested in economics by his father’s stories about the economics of milk truck 
deliveries under socialism.  About his later years as a graduate student at the University 
of Chicago, Lucas states that, “The atmosphere at Chicago, when I was a student, was so 
hostile to any kind of planning that we were not taught to think:  How should resources 
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to form expectations?  But these should always be an economist’s first questions.  My 
Dad was wrong to think that socialism would deliver milk efficiently, but he was right to 
think about how milk should be delivered.” 
Among his other statements are, “I am happy about the successes of general 
equilibrium theory in macro and sad about the de-emphasis on money that those 
successes have brought about.”  Regarding the importance of technology shocks, he 
comments:  “If we are discussing the U. S. depression in the 1930s or the depression in 
Indonesia today or Mexico five years ago, I would say that technology shocks are a 
minor part of the picture.  On the other hand, ... in postwar United States the relative 
importance ... is much larger.”  In response to the question, “is price stickiness an 
important economic phenomenon?” Lucas replied: “Yes.  In practice it is much more 
painful to put a modern economy through a deflation than the monetary theory we have 
would lead us to expect.”   
Lucas says the following about monetary policy, “I am concerned about the kind of 
bad dynamics that Wicksell, and more recently Peter Howitt, worried about.”  He further 
observes, “My claim is not that monetary instability is incapable of causing great harm, 
but only that it has not done so over the past 50 years in the United States.”  Lucas states 
the following about modern microeconomics, “In the past 15 years, microeconomics has 
come to be synonymous with game theory in many places (not including Chicago!), and 
that is unfortunate.” 
4.  Janos Kornai interviewed by Olivier Blanchard:  To many in the economics 
profession, Janos Kornai is a true hero.  While living in his home-country of Hungary 
under communism, he became famous among economists in the West, against the odds 
and at considerable danger to himself.  As explained by Olivier Blanchard in his 
introduction to this interview, “These difficulties have not prevented him from giving us 
the most informed and deepest critique of the socialist system to date.”  At present, 
Kornai shares his time between Harvard University and Collegium Budapest. 
Among the statements in this interview are the following:  “One of my closest 
friends was not only arrested, but tried and executed.  Many of my best friends were 
arrested...I was attacked as a ‘traitor’ to socialism.  I was fired.”  “I still admire Marx as 
an intellectual genius; he had many ideas which are still useful.  He was, however, 
absolutely wrong on many fundamental issues.”  “Before 1963, I had been denied a 
passport.  I had a standing invitation to the London School of Economics for years, for 
instance, and I couldn’t go.” 
Regarding his early book, Overcentralization, and the events that led up to it, 
Kornai observes:  “My disappointment began in 1953 .... , when many facts that had 
previously been hidden, became known ... the horrible crimes the system had committed, 
the imprisonment, torture, and murder of innocent people, made my most sincere beliefs 
seem naive and shameful.  Also, I began to recognize that the regime was economically 
dysfunctional and inefficient, created shortages, and suppressed initiative and 
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was the first critical book written by a citizen living inside the Bloc.”  He further 
observes that in the preface of the second edition of that book, he “described the Kornai 
of 1954-1956 as a ‘naive reformer.’” 
About his book, Anti-Equilibrium, he stated:  “I feel slightly bitter about its getting 
hardly any attention.  First, and nearly the last people who gave it any credit, were 
Arrow and Koopmans;  then it somehow disappeared...it seems to me that asking relevant 
questions doesn’t give you much reputation, at least not in our profession.” 
With respect to his book, Economics of Shortage, he states:  “The dysfunctional 
properties of socialism are systemic ... I was rather isolated from the rest of the so-called 
reformers who were working on small changes to the Communist system.  In that sense, 
it’s a revolutionary book...You have to change the system as a whole to get rid of the 
dysfunctional properties.” 
Changing the subject to his book, The Socialist System, he states that, “The central 
idea of the book was to show that the classical Stalinist system, however repressive and 
brutal it was, was coherent, while the more relaxed, half-reformed Gorbachev-type of 
system was incoherent, and subject to erosion.  I foresaw the erosion.” 
Kornai comments on the current post-communist Eastern Europe:  “I think people 
belonging to the elite of the former socialist regime have, with few exceptions, totally 
forgotten the Communist Manifesto, but they have a network of friends from the old days.  
Right now these relations are extremely powerful in business, in politics, in cultural life.  
People who knew each other in the old system, know exactly who is a friend and who is 
an enemy.” 
5.  Franco Modigliani interviewed by William Barnett and Robert Solow:  
Franco Modigliani won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1985, while a professor at MIT.  
This interview was conducted jointly by the 1987 MIT Nobel Laureate, Robert Solow, 
and me.  Since my initial interest in economics was motivated by Modigliani’s graduate 
course, which I took while an undergraduate student in engineering at MIT, I felt a 
particular responsibility to assure that Modigliani’s remarkable life and contributions 
would be adequately covered in this interview.  Many of the questions that I asked were 
based upon longstanding rumors heard by Modigliani’s students.  In this interview, you 
will learn the truth about those rumors. 
Modigliani and his parents left Italy, while under Mussolini’s fascist rule.  As he 
explains in this interview, “After the Ethiopian war and the fascist intervention in the 
Spanish Civil War, I began to develop a strong antifascist sentiment and the intent to 
leave Italy, but the final step was the close alliance of Mussolini with Hitler, which 
resulted in anti-Semitic laws, which made it impossible to live in Italy in a dignified 
way.”  As explained in some detail in the interview, he and his family first moved to 
France and then to the U.S.  He briefly returned from Paris to Rome, still under fascist 
rule, to defend his dissertation.  As he explained, “that operation was not without 
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antifascist groups in Paris, so there was the possibility of being harassed or being 
jailed.”  He describes a code that he used with his father-in-law as a warning, while he 
was in Rome.  It has been widely rumored, that Franco Modigliani was related to the 
famous painter and sculptor, Amedeo Modigliani.  But that story seems not to have been 
true.   
Modigliani’s first position in the United States was at the New School University in 
New York City.  He received an offer from Harvard, which he surprisingly turned down.  
His explanation is the following:  “Because the head of the department, Professor 
Burbank, whom I later found out had a reputation of being xenophobic and anti-Semitic, 
worked very hard and successfully to persuade me to turn down the offer.” 
Having turned down the Harvard offer, Modigliani moved to the University of 
Illinois, where the salary was higher than at Harvard.  Regarding his years at Illinois, he 
observes the following:  “The president of the university brought in a new wonderful 
dean, Howard H. Bowen.  But the old and incompetent faculty could not stand the fact 
that Bowen brought in some first-rate people... The old faculty was able to force Bowen 
out, as part of the witch hunt that was going on under the leadership of the infamous 
Senator Joseph McCarthy.  The leader of the McCarthyite wing of the elected trustees 
was the famous [football player] Red Grange.  I then quit in disgust with a blast that in 
the local press is still remembered:  ‘There is finally peace in the College of Commerce, 
but it is the peace of death.’  My departure was greeted with joy by the old staff, 
proportional to their incompetence.  But 40 years later, the university saw fit to give me 
an honorary degree!” 
The interview was conducted shortly before the stock market bubble burst in 2000, 
and contained the following statement by Modigliani, “I believe that indeed the stock 
market in the United States is in the grips of a serious bubble.  I think the overvaluation 
of stocks is probably on the order of 25%....In my view, there will be a collapse, because 
if there is a marked overvaluation, as I hold, it cannot disappear slowly.”  In this 
interview, he is on the record with that forecast, and indeed he was right.  No wonder one 
of Modigliani’s students, Robert Shiller, of Irrational Exuberance fame, has said of 
Modigliani, he is “my hero.” 
Modigliani says the following about Robert Barro, who also was in some of 
Modigliani’s classes: “In my view, Barro’s theorem, despite its elegance, has no 
substance.  I don’t understand why so many seem to be persuaded by a proposition whose 
proof rests on the incredible assumption that everybody cares about his heirs as if they 
were himself.”  Modigliani is referring to Barro’s view on Ricardian-equivalence and its 
implication of the irrelevance of government debt financing. 
About monetary policy and Friedman’s rule, Modigliani says:  “in the battle 
between my recommendation to make use of discretion (or common sense) and 
Friedman’s recommendation to renounce discretion in favor of blind rules ... , my 
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mechanical rule.”   
Franco Modigliani died in 2003. 
6.  Milton Friedman interviewed by John Taylor:  Milton Friedman won the Nobel 
Prize in Economics in 1976, while a professor at the University of Chicago.  As 
explained by John Taylor, in his introduction to the interview, “His views have had as 
much, if not more, impact on the way we think about monetary policy and many other 
important economic issues as those of any person in the last half of the twentieth 
century.”  
Regarding the “Great Inflation” in the 1970’s, Friedman states:  “I believe that 
Arthur Burns deserves a lot of blame...From the moment Burns got into the Fed, I think 
politics played a great role in what happened.  So far as Nixon was concerned, there is 
no doubt, as I know from personal experience.  I had a session with Nixon sometime in 
1970, I think it was 1970, might have been 1971, in which he wanted me to urge Arthur to 
increase the money supply more rapidly (laughter) and I said to the president, ‘Do you 
really want to do that?  The only effect of that will be to leave you with a larger inflation 
if you do get reelected.’  And he said, ‘Well, we’ll worry about that after we get 
reelected.’  Typical.  So there’s no doubt what Nixon’s pleasure was.”   
In this regard, I can mention that I was myself on the staff of the Federal Reserve 
Board from July 1973 to September 1990, which overlapped part of Burns’ term as 
Chairman.  I also met with him at the American Enterprise Institute, at his request, 
following the end of his term at the Board.  He stated that he indeed did deserve a lot of 
the blame, but he denied that the reason was political pressure.  He maintained that it was 
an honest mistake by him, based upon failure to recognize that the “natural rate” of 
unemployment had increased.  He said that that failure resulted in a misguided attempt to 
lower unemployment to unsustainably low levels.  But, of course, if political pressure 
from the White House really had played a role, it is unlikely that Burns would have 
admitted it to me.     
Other interesting statements in Friedman’s interview include:  “Nixon had a higher 
IQ than Reagan, but he was far less principled; he was political to an extreme degree.”  
Friedman reveals the following about Burns as a Ph.D. student, “Burns .... was living in 
Greenwich Village.  He had long hair, long fingernails.  You know, he was a different 
character than he was later on.”  Friedman says of himself as an undergraduate, “I 
probably would have described myself as a socialist, who knows.”  In reply to a question 
about the use of mathematics in economics, Friedman states, “I go back to what Alfred 
Marshall said about economics:  Translate your results into English and then burn the 
mathematics.”   
On the subject of the euro currency, Friedman says, “I think it will be a miracle --- 
well, a miracle is a little strong.  I think it’s highly unlikely that it’s going to be a great 
success.”  In addition, at the time of the interview, Friedman said in this interview, “The 
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appreciate and the dollar will depreciate.”  And indeed it has, in spades. 
7.  Paul A. Samuelson interviewed by William A. Barnett:  Paul Samuelson won 
the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1970, while a professor at MIT.  I was an undergraduate 
engineering student at MIT from 1959-1963.  To all students at MIT in all fields, there 
were two “gods” who loomed over the rest of the faculty:  the great mathematician, 
Norbert Wiener, and the great economist, Paul Samuelson.  At MIT, where all the tenured 
professors are world renowned research stars, to loom over the rest is possible only in the 
rarest of cases from any generation of scholars.   
To this day I think that many economists feel intimidated by Samuelson’s awesome 
intellect.  In fact, I was surprised by the difficulty that I had in finding an economist who 
was willing to take on the job of serving as interviewer of Samuelson.  I did finally find 
one (V. V. Chari at the University of Minnesota).  But he brought the tapes of the 
interview back with him on an airplane, after running them through the X-ray luggage 
scanner at an airport.  The tapes were destroyed by the scan.  So in this one case, rather 
than trying to find another willing interviewer, I conducted the interview entirely myself.  
Indeed, it was an experience.  
During his career, Paul Samuelson has averaged almost one technical paper per 
month.  He once said, “Let those who will --- write the nation’s laws --- if I can write its 
textbooks.”  It is widely reported that at the end of Samuelson’s dissertation defense at 
Harvard, the great economist Joseph Schumpeter turned to the Nobel Laureate, Wassily 
Leontief, and asked, “Well, Wassily, have we passed?” 
Regarding Leijonhufvud’s interpretation of Keynes, Samuelson said in this 
interview that, “I know him to have it wrong.”  In this interview, you can find 
Samuelson’s views on the “rash Reagan fiscal deficit.”  Changing the topic to his first 
economics teacher, Aaron Director, Samuelson says, “He was the only man alive who 
could .... speak of ‘my radical brother-in-law Milton Friedman’.”  Discussing 
Samuelson’s years as a student during the Depression, with Frank Knight as one of his 
professors, Samuelson says, “the only present choice was between communism and 
fascism.  And for himself, Knight would not choose the latter.  Later, understandably, he 
recovered from that failure of nerve and reneged on his circulated text.  Somewhere in 
my files will be found a copy of his doomsday text.” 
With respect to his years as a student at the University of Chicago, he characterized 
that economics department as “dogmatically conservative.”  He then moved to Harvard 
University as a graduate student, and comments on those years as follows:  “Anti-
Semitism was omni-present in pre-World War II academic life, here and abroad.”  
Samuelson comments on the faculty at Harvard as follows: “Hitler (and Lenin) did much 
for American science.  Leontief, Schumpeter, and Haberler brought Harvard to life after 
a lean period.”  He continues that upon completion of his studies, “When MIT made a 
good offer, we thought this could test whether there was great enthusiasm for my staying 
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that I stay, we moved three miles down the Charles River.” 
Characterizing the nature of  his influence on Washington during Camelot, 
Samuelson comments that, “With great reluctance, I let Senator John F. Kennedy recruit 
me to his think tank...Only when they needed my extra heavy lifting from Cambridge did I 
weigh in.” 
On the subject of globalization, Samuelson comments that, “Trade is confirmed to 
be a substitute for massive immigration from poor to rich countries.  U.S. labor has lost 
its old monopoly on American advanced know-how and capital ... Free trade need not 
help everybody everywhere ... Nowadays every short-term victory by a union only speeds 
up the day that its industry moves abroad ... A ‘cowed’ labor force runs scared under the 
newly evolved form of a ruthless corporate governance.” 
As should be no surprise from these comments, Samuelson goes on to observe that, 
“probably as a syndicated columnist, I have published at monthly intervals a couple of 
thousand different journalistic articles.” 
8.  Paul Volcker interviewed by Perry Mehrling:  Paul Volcker was President of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from 1975-1979 and Chairman of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System from 1979-1987 under both Presidents Carter 
and Reagan. 
With respect to Arthur Burns’ views about suspending convertibility of the dollar 
into gold, Volcker said, “Burns didn’t want to do any of this.  He was holding out to the 
end.  I didn’t think he had any realistic ideas as to how to reform the System, except he 
seemed to think we could negotiate a change in the price of gold without suspending 
convertibility.”  About his own experience during that period of needed reform, he said, 
“It’s a sad story, engraved on my mind ... I was the American negotiator for reforming 
the system.  I don’t know how close we really came to an agreement.  It was very difficult.  
But about the time when maybe an agreement was in sight, the oil price shock was used 
as an excuse to end the effort.” 
I was myself on the staff of the Federal Reserve Board during much of the 
“monetarist experiment” years of 1979-1982, and it was very clear to me that Volcker 
was sincere in his wish to try a monetarist policy to tame the double digit inflation that 
existed in the late 1970s.  But when that new policy produced a recession, it became 
fashionable among the monetarists of the time to say that the Board really was not 
following a monetarist policy, and was just using that claim as a cover-up for 
continuation of the old policy.  I never agreed with that interpretation of what I saw, and 
indeed Volcker in this interview makes clear what really happened, in the following 
statement: 
“I used to rankle when some of the members of the Board who were all enthusiastic 
about this turn of policy would say, ‘Isn’t this just a kind of public relations ploy to avoid 
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did think it was largely that.  It was a very common thing to say that we just did it to 
obfuscate.”  About the objective of controlling the money growth rate during that three 
year period, Volcker explained further, “we had no other good benchmark for how much 
to raise interest rates in the midst of a volatile inflationary situation.” 
On the subject of credit controls, Volcker commented:  “There was a law that had 
been passed in the early 1970’s to embarrass President Nixon, authorizing the president 
to call for credit controls.  It was a two-stage thing.  He could call for controls, but the 
Federal Reserve would have to implement them.  So Carter took the view that he wanted 
credit controls.  I didn’t like the idea... But President Carter wanted to do something ... I 
said to the Board, ‘Let us do as little as we possibly can, consistent with the request or 
demand that we have some credit controls ...  I shouldn’t have done anything, logically 
...Consumption just collapsed ... We took the controls off as soon as we could.” 
On the controversies regarding floating exchange rates versus a possible future 
single international currency, Volcker comments that, “for many countries, particularly 
small and open countries, a floating currency is more trouble than the independent 
monetary policy is worth ... We will need to think in terms of some truly international 
standard, the role that gold used to play.”  Volcker says the following about 
deregulation, “I think that financial deregulation has been another big strand of what 
I’ve been concerned about ...When I was in the Treasury in the sixties, Wright Patman, 
an extreme populist from Texas and chairman of the House Banking Committee, made a 
speech complaining that we had too few bank failures and too little risk taking.  Well, we 
have fixed that problem!” 
Volcker reveals his views on modern risk management in the statement, “The whole 
concept rests on the idea of normal distribution curves, but there ain’t no normal 
distribution when it comes to financial crises.”  On the subject of the Russian central 
bank, Volcker says it “is pretty well destroyed by accusations, rightly or wrongly, that 
they are corrupt in the most egregious sense.” 
It is perhaps interesting to observe that this interview was acquired following a 
somewhat unusual exchange.  I wrote to Paul Volcker on August 10, 1999, inviting him 
to be interviewed for publication in Macroeconomic Dynamics.  He replied in a letter on 
January 5, 2000 agreeing, but with the following qualification:  “I apologize for a long 
delayed response.  Perhaps it was my allergy to ‘Divisia monetary aggregates’ that 
accounts for the lapse.”
4  
The reason for his hesitancy is not difficult to understand.  I originated the Divisia 
monetary aggregates at the end of the 1970s, while on the staff of the Federal Reserve 
Board (in the Special Studies Section).  During the “monetarist experiment” of 1979 - 
2002, my aggregates were growing at half the rate of the official simple sum monetary 
                                                 
4 An interesting contrast is Lucas’s (2000, p. 279) more recent statement, “I share the widely held opinion 
that M1 is too narrow an aggregate for this period [the 1990s], and I think that the Divisia approach offers 
much the best prospects for resolving this difficulty.” 
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reflecting the restrictiveness of policy, and that policy would result in a recession.  
Perhaps the recession that followed, as I had warned, is the source of Volcker’s “allergy.”  
I subsequently published that data and documentation in a paper in the American 
Statistical Association’s journal, the American Statistician.  When I submitted the paper 
to that journal, its editor, Gary G. Koch, had the paper refereed by an astonishing six 
referees.  In addition on the telephone, he informed me he was worried that publishing 
my results would cause his journal to be overwhelmed by angry letters to the editor.  I 
assured him that the kinds of people who would send such letters do not likely read his 
journal.  The article appeared in Barnett (1984). 
But there is more.  After the economy had recovered from the recession (and I had 
left the Board for a professorship at the University of Texas), there was a huge spike in 
the simple sum monetary aggregates, but no spike in my Divisia monetary aggregates.  
On September 26, 1983, the world’s leading “monetarist,” Milton Friedman, in a full 
page article in Newsweek magazine (p. 84), wrote, “The monetary explosion from July 
1982 to July 1983 leaves no satisfactory way out ... The result is bound to be renewed 
stagflation --- recession accompanied by rising inflation and high interest rates ... The 
only real uncertainty is when the recession will begin.”  But on the exact same day, 
September 26, 1983, I said in a full page article in Forbes magazine (p. 196), “people 
have been panicking unnecessarily about money supply growth this year ... The Divisia 
aggregates are rising at a rate not much different from last year’s ... the ‘apparent 
explosion’ can be viewed as a statistical blip.”   
The stagflation never developed, as anticipated by my published analysis.  To this 
day the monetarists have not recovered from the two successive public embarrassments.  
An overview of these events and the evidence can be found in Barnett (1997).
5
9.  Martin Feldstein interviewed by James Poterba:  Martin Feldstein spent two 
years as the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers during Ronald Reagan’s 
administration, while on leave from his professorship at Harvard University.  As 
explained by James Poterba in his introduction to this interview, “he warned frequently 
of the long-term economic costs of large budget deficits, even though this was a very 
unpopular view on political grounds.”  Poterba continues that, “His 1995 Ely Lecture to 
the American Economic Association was a clarion call drawing economic researchers to 
the analysis of Social Security reform proposals, and it anticipated the very active policy 
debate of the last half decade.”  Feldstein has had more than 60 Ph.D. students at 
Harvard, and has been President of the National Bureau of Economic Research, since 
1977.  In 1992, he was elected President of the American Economic Association.   
Regarding his research on American health care, he observes that “there was a 
dynamic in which the higher the price, the more insurance you wanted, and the more 
insurance you had, the higher the equilibrium market price...my estimates implied that 
the existing system was on an explosive path in which some exogenous force would be 
                                                 
5 There also is an online press report from the Royal Economic Society’s Economic Journal at 
http://www.res.org.uk/society/mediabriefings/pdfs/1997/July/barnett.asp. 
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deductibles would make the health care market work better.” 
  When asked about his time as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors 
in 1982-1984 under the Reagan administration, Feldstein comments that, “it soon became 
clear that the budget deficit was going to be an enormous problem.”  In this interview, 
you will also learn of Feldstein’s weekly breakfasts with Paul Volcker. 
10.  Christopher Sims interviewed by Lars Peter Hansen:  Chris Sims has been 
President of the Econometric Society and is a member of the National Academy of 
Sciences.  His role in the development of multivariate time series methodology is 
fundamental to modern econometrics.   
In my opinion, one of the most brilliant publications in the fields of econometrics 
and statistics is Sims (1971).  About that paper, Sims states the following:  “Since the 
work on infinite dimensional spaces was technically beyond what was appearing in 
economics journals, I sent Sims (1971) to the Annals of Mathematical Statistics ...  The 
editor wrote, ‘Sorry it’s taken so long.  I had a hard time finding any referees.  Here’s a 
referee report.’ The referee report said, ‘I really don’t understand what this paper is 
about, but I’ve checked some of the theorems and they seem to be correct, so I guess we 
should publish it.’” 
Among his other comments on applied econometrics, are the following:  
“Specifications in which responses to what are purported to be monetary policy shocks 
are clearly ridiculous, tend not to be reported.  This informal aspect has bothered some 
people.”  He also says, “I argue ... that econometricians have failed to confront the 
problems of inference that are central to macroeconomic policy modeling.”  Revealing 
his views on macroeconometric policy models, Sims states, “The models are now in a 
sorry state.” 
11.  Robert Shiller interviewed by John Campbell:  Robert Shiller is known to 
almost everyone, because of his famous popular book, Irrational Exuberance, which 
was astonishingly prescient about the stock market bubble that burst shortly after the 
appearance of the book.  That book came out in March 2000, at the top of the market.  As 
he explains in his interview, he “wrote that book at breakneck speed.”  In his interview, 
Shiller comments that the view that “every movement in the stock market must have a 
rational foundation ... is ‘one of the greatest errors in the history of economic thought.’”  
He further comments on “the expected present-value model for aggregate stock prices, 
that is egregiously wrong.”   
In his interview, you will learn about the influence on his thinking of his 
psychologist wife, Ginny, and her associates in psychology.  On the general subject of the 
economics profession, Shiller comments that, “Economists themselves are herd-like in 
their research directions, and so there is a lot to be gained by staying away from these 
common topics.” 
  1712.  Stanley Fischer interviewed by Olivier Blanchard:  Stanley Fischer has been 
Governor of the Bank of Israel since May 2005.  He was interviewed by Olivier 
Blanchard, Professor of Economics at MIT.  The interview was completed while the two 
of them were running together in Central Park, NY.  Stanley Fischer was previously 
Chief Economist at the World Bank, First Deputy Managing Director of the International 
Monetary Fund, President of Citigroup International, and Professor of Economics at MIT.  
According to Olivier Blanchard, Stanley Fischer while a professor at MIT had “acquired 
near-guru status,” and now has become “a Master of the Universe, and world VIP.”  In 
his interview, you will learn about Stanley Fischer’s youth in Southern Rhodesia, now 
called Zimbabwe.   
Included among the statements in his interview, is the following:  “When I was in 
high school, Dag Hammarskjold was this great man.  Then he was killed in the then-
Belgian Congo, right next door.  I knew he had done good in the world and my parents 
had brought me up to believe I should do good in the world.  I realized that economics 
would help you do good ... That factor was probably there and moved me over the course 
of time.” 
13.  Jacques Drèze interviewed by Pierre Dehez  and Omar Licandro:  Jacque 
Drèze is one of Europe’s most famous and deeply-respected economists.  Having 
received his Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1958 and being a founder of Belgium’s 
eminent economics research center, the Centre for Operations Research and 
Econometrics, his insights into the evolution of economic thought, and of his own 
contributions therein, span both sides of the Atlantic.  He has received 15 honorary 
doctorates from universities on both sides of the Atlantic.  From this interview, you can 
learn about the Louvain Bayesian School, the Belgian-French research on general 
equilibrium under price rigidities and quantity rationing, and other areas of economic 
research and policy less well known in the U. S. than in Europe. 
Of particular interest is his commentary on the difference in policy influence of 
economists in the U.S. versus those in Europe.  On that subject, he observes:  “It is 
indeed the standard view that economists are less influential in Europe than in the United 
States.  Two comments on that issue.  First, in Europe there is no economic authority 
comparable to the U. S. government.  Why?  Because Europe is a Union, a confederation 
of states, so the prerogatives at the level of the Union are limited; the decision process at 
that level is complicated and carries limitations.  Economic advisers to the Commission 
are remote from the decision making body, namely the Council of Ministers.  In contrast, 
in the United States, the chief economic adviser attends the meetings of the cabinet where 
the decisions are made.  So, there is no chain of communications; the economic adviser is 
right there.  In addition, the cabinet in the United States has much more direct authority 
than the Council of Ministers in Europe.  In that sense, there is much less influence of 
economic advisers on policy decisions in Europe than in the United States.” 
14.  Tom Sargent interviewed by George Evans and Seppo Honkapohja:  As 
Samuelson’s book, Foundations of Economic Analysis, mathematized neoclassical 
microeconomics and educated a generation of economists in rigorous microeconomic 
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generation of economists in rigorous macroeconomic analysis.  In keeping with the deep 
insights evident in all of his published research, his interview is penetrating.   
For example, on the evolution of calibration methodology in empirical economics 
and its relationship with formal statistical theory, Sargent observed the following:  
“Calibration is less optimistic about what your theory can accomplish, because you’d 
only use it, if you didn’t fully trust your entire model, meaning that you think your model 
is partly misspecified or incompletely specified, or if you trusted someone else’s model 
and data set more than your own.  My recollection is that Bob Lucas and Ed Prescott 
were initially very enthusiastic about rational expectations econometrics.  After all, it 
simply involved imposing on ourselves the same high standards we had criticized the 
Keynesians for failing to live up to.  But after about five years of doing likelihood ratio 
tests on rational expectations models, I recall Bob Lucas and Ed Prescott both telling me 
that those tests were rejecting too many good models.  The idea of calibration is to ignore 
some of the probabilistic implications of your model, but to retain others.  Somehow, 
calibration was intended as a balanced response to professing that your model, though 
not correct, is still worthy as a vehicle for quantitative policy analysis.”   
He continues that, “In the 1980s, there were occasions when it made sense to say, 
‘it is too difficult to maximize the likelihood function, and besides if we do, it will blow 
our model out of the water.  In the 2000s, there are fewer occasions when you can get by 
saying this.” 
Regarding Neil Wallace, Sargent observes:  “Neil thinks that cash-in-advance 
models are useless and gets ill every time he sees a cash-in-advance constraint.  For 
Neil, what could be worse than a model with a cash-in-advance constraint?  A model 
with two cash-in-advance constraints.”  Sargent further observes, “Except for our paper 
on commodity money, not our best in my opinion, Neil asked me to remove his name from 
every paper that he and I wrote together.”  Of course Neil’s name was not removed from 
all those papers; Sargent said the following about the introduction to one of the papers 
that they did coauthor:  “After he read the introduction to one of our JPE papers, Bob 
Lucas told me that no referee could possibly say anything more derogatory about our 
paper than what we had written about it ourselves.  Neil wrote those critical words.”   
15.  Robert Aumann interviewed by Sergiu Hart:  Robert Aumann won the Nobel 
Prize in Economics in 2005, while a professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 
one month before his interview appeared in Macroeconomic Dynamics.  Aumann is 
widely viewed as one of the world’s most brilliant mathematicians, at the forefront of 
advances in economic game theory.  Born in Germany and educated in America, he is an 
Israeli who is deeply orthodox in his Jewish religion.  His doctorate is in algebraic 
topology from MIT, and his post-doc was at Princeton.  In his interview, he explained 
that his “interest in mathematics actually started in high school---the Rabbi Jacob Joseph 
Yeshiva (Hebrew Day School) on the lower east side of New York City ... I did a bit of 
soul-searchinig when finishing high school, on whether to become a Talmudic scholar, or 
study secular subjects at a university.  For a while I did both.  But after one semester it 
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mathematics.” 
About his study and research as a Ph.D. student at MIT, Aumann observed:  “Like 
number theory, knot theory was totally, totally useless.  So, I was attracted to knots ...  
Fifty years later, the ‘absolutely useless’ --- the ‘purest of the pure’ --- is taught in the 
second year of medical school.” 
He reveals the following about a conference in 1961: “Kissinger spoke about game-
theoretic thinking in Cold War diplomacy ... People were really afraid that the world was 
coming to an end.”  Regarding the Cuban missile crisis, Aumann states, “Kennedy was 
influenced by the game-theoretic school ... Kissinger and Herman Kahn were the main 
figures in that.  Kennedy is now praised for his handling of that crises; indeed, the proof 
of the pudding is in the eating.” 
On the subject of “rationality,” Aumann comments, “People often make the mistake 
of saying that war is irrational ... We take all the ills of the world and dismiss them by 
calling them irrational.  They are not necessarily irrational.  Though it hurts, they may be 
rational.  Saying that war is irrational may be a big mistake ... If we simply dismiss it as 
irrational, we can’t address the problem.” 
In reply to a question about religion, Aumann states, “Religion is very different 
from science.  The main part of religion is not about the way that we model the real 
world ... Religion is an experience --- mainly an emotional and esthetic one ... When you 
play the piano, when you climb a mountain, does that contradict your scientific 
endeavors? ... It doesn’t contradict;  it is orthogonal ... in science we have certain ways 
of thinking about the world, and in religion we have different ways of thinking about the 
world.  Those two things coexist side by side without conflict.” 
In an interesting commentary on his move with his family out of Germany in the 
1930s, Aumann explained:  “We got away in 1938.  Actually we had planned to leave 
already when Hitler came to power in 1933, but for one reason or another we didn’t.  
People convinced my parents that it wasn’t so bad; it will be okay, this thing will blow 
over.  The German people will not allow such a madman to take over, etc., etc.  A well-
known story.  But it illustrates that when one is in the middle of things, it is very, very 
difficult to see the future.  Things seem clear in hindsight, but in the middle of the crisis, 
they are very murky.” 
By analogy, Aumann similarly commented on the Six-Day War in 1967:  “In 
hindsight it was ‘clear’ that Israel would come out on top of that conflict.  But at the time 
... it wasn’t at all clear that Israel would survive ... Prime Minister Eshkol was very 
worried.  He made a broadcast in which he stuttered and his concern was very evident, 
very real ... Herb Scarf was here during the crisis.  When he left, about two weeks before 
the war, we said good-bye, and it was clear to both of us that we might never see each 
other again.”  
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as it is practiced.  Now, true behavioral economics does in fact exist; it is called 
empirical economics. This really is behavioral economics.  In empirical economics, you 
go and see how people behave in real life.”   
16.  James Tobin and Robert Shiller interviewed by David Colander:  James Tobin 
won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1981, while a professor at Yale.  This joint 
interview of James Tobin and Robert Shiller at Yale was different from the others 
published in Macroeconomic Dynamics and was characterized as a “dialogue” rather 
than an “interview” in the journal.  The other interviews were of one person and focused 
exclusively on the work and life of that one economist.  This interview was in the form of 
a dialogue among two persons and a moderator on a particular topic, “The Yale School of 
Economics.”  While Tobin is clearly central to this dialogue, it is interesting to contrast 
Shiller’s part of this interview with the interview of Thomas Sargent.  While the Shiller 
and Sargent interviews are in many ways very different, both provide deep, penetrating, 
and clearly contrasting insights into modern macroeconomics. 
In this dialogue, there seems to be more sympathy for the Milton Friedman version 
of the conservative “Chicago School” than for the more recent real-business-cycle 
approach.  In response to the following  question from the moderator, “How about the 
real-business-cycle theorists?”, Tobin replied, “Well, that’s just the enemy ... That’s 
what we’ve been fighting about all these years, and that’s just a repetition of the conflict 
between Keynes himself and the economists he regarded as Classicals.”  He continues, 
“The New Classicals and the real-business-cycle believers are much more extreme than 
the people that Keynes was arguing with in his day, but it’s the same argument over 
again.  Actually Pigou was a much more reasonable, plausible economist than Lucas and 
some of the other New Classicals.” 
In Shiller’s part of this dialogue, he says, “the Yale school must be thought of as 
politically much more liberal than the conservative Chicago School ... What image do we 
have of Tobin?  To me, he comes through as a very moral person and who has genuine 
sympathy for others.  That means he sees what other people are suffering and he wants to 
correct that.  You get that sense more from him than from very many economists.”   
James Tobin died in 2002. 
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  22History of Thought Introduction: 
Economists Talking with Economists, An Historian’s Perspective 
By E. Roy Weintraub 
 
 
The ambitious and long-running project initiated by William Barnett, Editor of 
Macroeconomic Dynamics, has produced a number of conversations in which eminent 
economists are interviewed by other economists well informed about the interviewee’s 
work.  What we have then is a collection of conversations about both economics and the 
economists’ lives and about, in a larger sense, how a community of modern social 
scientists conducts its business.  
 
The conversations are unusual records.  Though they provide the reader with a 
privileged seat at conversations with the eminent, and they enhance our understanding of 
those eminences, they are not themselves a history of economics, even as the 
conversationalists appear to be talking over their shoulders to “the historical record”. Yet 
there is a difference between what historians of economics consider to be historically 
useful and what their scientist-economist subjects find historically useful.  The 
interviewees seek to construct a particular interested interpretation of the historical 
record, one in which they are featured
6, and being interviewed by a former student or 
present colleague, senior or junior, accentuates this problem. I say “problem” because 
“scientists and historians tend to find different things interesting about the past, to want to 
use their history for different purposes, and to select their sources and write their 
accounts accordingly.”  (Hughes 1997, 26)  This point is well understood by historians of 
science, and to a lesser degree by scientists themselves.  It is not so well understood by 
most economists.   
 
“There are two principal issues of concern.  First, there is the issue of 
contested interpretation and the difficulty of grounding historical analysis 
in the face of what might be a well-entrenched actors’ history (and, 
indeed, in the face of potentially litigious actors). . . [Second] there are 
those scientists who wish to retain such control over their history that they 
will not tolerate anything that departs from the ‘official’ 
(heroic/celebratory/whiggish?) line.”  (ibid., 27).   
 
Both these issues surface in the conversations. As an example of the former, 
consider the interchange in the Milton Friedman interview about his work during World 
War II as a member of the Statistical Research Group. Friedman there presents a view of 
the economists’ ideas about optimization as having shaped the military’s understanding, 
                                                 
6 This issue is readily apparent in an earlier collection of interviews of macroeconomists, 
conducted by Arjo Klamer (1984) on the subject of what was called at the time the New 
Classical Economics, but which now is associated with Keynesian versus real business 
cycle approaches to macroeconomics. 
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And as an amusing (at least to me) example of the second, I note the place in the Paul 
Samuelson interview where he wonders whether his own understanding of his writings on 
some biological topics might be re-interpreted by “future Philip Mirowskis and Roy 
Weintraubs.”  
 
Non-interested conversations though may produce emotionally complex interview 
situations: 
 
 “For some scientists, moreover, history is so valuable a resource that 
to write history which doesn’t legitimate science in some way is actually 
seen as positively de-legitimating—in other words, as “undermining” 
science in some cases—which can generate a profound hostility toward 
professional historians of science and their writings.  (ibid, 28) 
 
We have some of these issues involved in the Robert Aumann interview, where it is 
noted that a lot of work in game theory was done as part of the cold war enlistment of 
mathematicians and economists in that war. The hypothesis of the politically disinterested 
scientist-economist is falsified by such work, and in Aumann’s case additionally by the 
connection of Israel’s defense-military needs and its large number of game theorists, but 
these are questions that cannot be raised (especially by Hart, Aumann’s former student) 
without its being said that such a line of questioning appears designed to “de-legitimize” 
some serious work in game theory.  
 
As documents that form part of the historical record, the conversations collected in 
this volume share some features with more traditional oral history.  But they do have their 
limitations: 
 
“In the mere act of historian meeting scientist, and making the 
scientist aware that his or her opinions and recollections will be preserved 
and may be exploited by future historians, scientists may be prompted to 
adopt a public image, even a mask, if you will, that reflects what do they 
want to have remembered about themselves, their life and their 
accomplishments.”  (DeVorkin 1990, 47) 
 
Put another way, and with respect to the collection of conversations that follow, the 
fact that the materials were edited with the approval of (and in some cases rewritten by) 
the various subjects suggests that the economists themselves were effectively in charge of 
the interviews, and no material that undermined their own understandings of their work 
would be developed in the conversation.  
 
Even with that in mind,  
 
“Underneath the intensions of the scientists, memory is faulty to start 
with, and imperfectly designed questions posed by historians stimulate 
improper responses, and therefore falsely distorted visions of history.  In 
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influences a reply.  It is not unusual to find that an historian, already deep 
into his or her subject, may have a broader and quite different perspective 
on a scientist’s life and the scientist being interviewed, especially if that 
scientist did not work in isolation but within a larger structural or 
organization, as most do today”  (ibid., 48). 
 
What I am suggesting of course is that these conversations are proto-oral histories 
for the very obvious reason that, with two exceptions, they were not conversations 
conducted by historians in a standard oral history format. A feature of a conversation in 
which an eminent economist is interviewed by another well-known economist who has a 
direct familiarity with a subject area of the interviewee’s work introduces various biases 
into the record.  One difference for example between a historian interviewing a subject, 
and a colleague interviewing that same subject, is that the subject will likely assume that 
the historian does not have a detailed understanding of the particular ideas, topics, 
analyses that the subject believes are his or her own contribution.  With a colleague, the 
interview subject is much more likely to move quickly over technical material, and is 
much less likely to attempt to justify, let alone explain, an interest in working with that 
material in the first place
7.  Thus in reading the conversations it will become more 
difficult for a non-specialist reader to understand the intricacies of what might appear to 
be a code-laden discussion between two colleagues than would be the case were that 
discussion conducted by a historian.  Moreover the questions that the historian would 
wish to address are seldom similar to the questions about which an economist would seek 
illumination.   
 
It is for this reason that the extensive record of the development of modern physics 
has been put together not by physicists but by the American Institute of Physics Center 
for the History of Physics in New York.  This long-running program has its transcribed 
interviews on deposit at the Niels Bohr Library of the AIP in New York City.  This 
project is conducted by professional historians, all of whom are specially trained as oral 
historians; and because of the cross connections of the interview subjects and the work 
they did, those historians are fully informed about the nature and scope of the 
interviewees’ work.   
 
We have no such organization in economics
8.  The work of historians of economics 
is carried out by “lone” individuals, and there is no funding source available to sponsor 
                                                 
7 I note that although both Perry Merhling and David Colander might be considered 
historians of economics, they each consider themselves to be primarily economists.  
8 A partial exception involves the professional oral history interviews of economists who 
worked for various US Presidential administrations. In this case, the historians at the 
National Archives often interview or supervise the interviewing of economists and place 
the tapes and transcripts in the appropriate Presidential Library. For instance, there is a 
set of interviews done in 1964 and recorded by Joseph Pechman (from the Brookings 
Institution) with Walter Heller, Kermit Gordon, James Tobin, Gardner Ackley, and Paul 
Samuelson for the Kennedy Library Oral History Program (Barber 1975).  
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they can by studying reports about what constitute good oral histories, and perhaps 
consulting one of several manuals on how to conduct an oral history in the history of 
science (see for example (DeVorkin 1990) and (Everett 1992)).   
 
The conversations in this volume were not done in such a unified fashion:  the 
editor did not require the interviewers to attend “oral history school” nor did he require 
their accounts to be homogenized in the same way that the accounts done by the AIP 
reflect a particular set of questions that are asked of all subjects, albeit with flexibility to 
move off those topics as the interview develops.   
 
This tension between scientists as historians, and historians of science is nicely 
described by Stephen Brush (1995) who points out that the conflicts range all the way 
from the belief among some historians that scientists are incapable of historical writing 
because of the necessary “presentism” and whiggishness, to the view of some scientists 
that only those who have participated in the construction of science have the competence 
to evaluate that which is important for the historical record.  This position was starkly 
presented by Andre Weil (1978), the distinguished mathematician, who argued in a 
plenary lecture at the World Congress of Mathematics that “The craft of mathematical 
history can best be practiced by those of us who are or have been active mathematicians 
or at least are in close contact with active mathematicians” (440).   
 
However the instincts and socialization of economists and historians of economics 
lead them to ask different kinds of questions about the past.  Most economists will see the 
development of economics as a sequence of problems thrown up either by the world, 
called the economy, or by the development of tools, techniques, and theorizations.  That 
is, most economists see economics as a problem-solving activity and the history of 
economics as a sequence of problems posed, solved, re-described, and further re-posed 
and resolved.  For them, the economist is a figure who is trained and socialized to 
recognize these economic problems and to operate in a world in which framing and 
solving such problems defines the profession of economists.  Certainly in the interviews 
that follow we hear the interviewer asking about the origination of a particular problem, 
and the mindset and tools that were necessary to solve that problem which represented 
the contribution of the interviewee.  The interviewers and the interviewees are in effect 
acting as economists, collaborating by stabilizing the community’s understanding of the 
emergence of the problems, and the development of the tools and expertise that were 
needed to solve them.  Topics like the interviewees’ education, professional working 
environment etc. are all associated with constructing the interviewee as well placed both 
intellectually, and emotionally, to answer the particular questions that the economy and 
the economic profession “put on the table”.  This is fully consistent with a writing of the 
history of economics that historians have called OTSOG-ery, an acronym for “On the 
Shoulders of Giants,” reflecting the apocryphal statement by Isaac Newton that he could 
see farther, do better science, because he stood on the shoulders etc.  This perspective is 
widely shared among scientists and is reflected in the process and result of the awarding 
of the Nobel Memorial Prize in economic science where the award citations speak of 
specific contributions.  Thus it is the contributions that are the focus of the discussion and 
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community.  
 
It should be apparent however that the historian’s interest is different
9. For 
historians, context is everything, so they would treat the conversations as partial source 
material of some limited use in constructing a serious history.  The historical narrative is 
not a succession of this, then that, then that, then that.  Rather, it is an interweaving of 
many stories in a tapestry involving the local, and contingent, in a contextualization of all 
the this-s and that-s.  The historian is interested in a larger story, a more multi-layered 
story
10 than “I came, I saw the problem needed to be solved, I figured out the way to do 
it.”   
 
Let me now look more directly at the conversations to suggest how the 
particularities of these individuals and their experiences connect to some larger narratives 
that historians of economics have been developing over the past couple of decades. 
 
First, it should be recognized that Samuelson, Friedman, Leonteif, and Modigliani 
are of a different generation from most of the other interviewees.  These individuals came 
of age intellectually from the late 1930s through the 1940s.  That period saw the two 
most important contingencies for the development of economics in the 20
th century, the 
Great Depression and World War II.  (James Tobin, just a few years younger, likewise 
might be associated with this group.)   
 
Historians now are coming to understand that the story of the development of 
neoclassical economics as a progressive march from the marginalist revolution of the late 
nineteenth century, to today, is a fiction.  It is especially a fiction with respect to 
economics in the United States.  A number of recent studies have demonstrated quite 
convincingly to historians that what emerged as neoclassical (mainstream) economics in 
the post-war period was but one of a number of different approaches to doing economics 
(see Morgan and Rutherford 1998; Weintraub 2002; Mirowski 2002; Yonay 1998).  It 
was not simply that institutionalism, an American kind of economics, was gradually 
pushed out by neoclassical economics, but rather there were a number of variants of 
neoclassical economics all competing for economists’ attention as late as the late 1930s.  
Moreover, the theoretical contributions of Keynes in his 1936 book were playing out side 
by side with a more general understanding that the policy recommendations that flowed 
from Keynes’ general theory had been part of public policy discussions much earlier 
(Hutchison 1968; Davis 1971; Howson and Winch 1977).   
 
                                                 
9 Although I will not develop the point here, I must note that the interviews generally 
restrict the development of the subject’s autobiographical material to the circumstances 
of the economist’s contributions qua economist. We thus do not find the usual 
recollection “bump” for memories of the early adult years (Weintraub 2005). 
10 For a fuller discussion of the alternative ways historians of economics might construct 
such histories, see (Weintraub 1999) and Weintraub 2002, 256-272).  
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which over the course of the 20
th century economics became a scientific discipline in a 
very particular sense.  The characteristic that most people think of when they associate 
economics with science involves the organized presentation of the core of the discipline, 
generally in a mathematical form.  That is, individuals associate a science with various 
theories and laws that can be expressed mathematically, and that are derived from, or that 
confront, data that is separately generated although conceptually linked with the theories.  
Of course much of economics does have this kind of resemblance to work done in other 
scientific disciplines.  But the characteristics of a science, at least a developed science, go 
far beyond the way its “texts” appear.  These days, one doesn’t do an experiment in 
particle physics in one’s basement lab.  One doesn’t attempt controlled fusion 
experiments out in the garage.  Science is characterized by an enormity of scale, of 
funding, and of human numbers.  It’s a long way from a time when one could walk 
around a 1930s university campus and find the Chemistry Department sharing space with 
both the Economics Department and the French Department.  If one looks around at a 
modern university, especially one engaged in biological science work perhaps connected 
to an academic medical center, one sees how the scale has changed.  We think of the 
Manhattan Project and understand the origins of “big science”, but it is not often 
appreciated just how the scale of “doing economics” has changed as well since World 
War II.  These days when many graduate Ph.D. programs admit from one to two dozen or 
more students annually, it is hard to look back and see that Ph.D. study before the 1960s 
was a very unusual activity.  There were simply not many graduate students.  But in the 
post-Sputnik era with more students, and more mentors for those students, specialization 
and the division of labor produced research done by “the labor group” at university X or 
“the public economics group” at university Y.  Ph.D. students are products of these 
groups much as Ph.D. students in the sciences come from Professor X’s lab or that of 
Professor Y.  Generally gone are the days when an economics professor might supervise 
dissertations from many different areas over the course of a decade.  That doesn’t happen 
anymore, just as a theoretical physicist these days does not supervise an experimental 
dissertation.   
 
Big science emerged during World War II with the immense activity of building the 
atomic bomb, and the direct engagement of scientists in the war effort.  Aircraft design 
and production, radar, sonar, guidance systems, computation systems, all emerged in that 
war time period through the collaboration of scientists, engineers, military planners and 
strategists, and social scientists, particularly economists.  The kinds of tools and 
symmetries in analysis that Samuelson had explored in his pre-war doctoral dissertation 
were fully in play during the war as optimization analysis became central to the work of 
the research groups involving economists linked by the Applied Mathematics Panel to the 
RAD Lab at MIT, the Statistical Research Group at Columbia, and the soon to emerge 
RAND in Santa Monica.  It is not just that economics became more scientific through 
these interconnections, but rather that science became more like what we now think of as 
science.  The public relations call to continue public support of science at such a high 
(wartime) level was made by Vannevar Bush (1945) in his “Science, the endless 
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11 but of course economics was on that frontier.  That economics eventually was 
to partake of the largesse of the National Science Foundation was one result, as was the 
support of economists through the Army, the Air Force and the Office of Naval Research.   
 
In the conversations presented in this volume one does not find much of an 
emphasis on particular technical details, technical innovations and analysis, as much as a 
sense of the “rootedness” of the contributions in larger problems.  Indeed, in the Leontief 
interview we find even a series of complaints about the increasingly technical nature of 
economic theory.  Nevertheless, the technical details of economic analysis are not totally 
absent from the conversations. Listening in on the younger economists like Fischer and 
Cass and Lucas we hear scientific-technical conversation, in which matters at issue are 
problems, and problems are meant to be solved.  To some degree of course this is a 
particularly American perspective.  The career-problems faced by Jacques Drèze and 
Janos Kornai are systematically quite different from those faced by economists working 
in the United States.  Nevertheless the perspective of this volume confirms that 
mainstream economics is pretty much an American invention, and has been sustained in 
its intellectual vigor by the American higher education system, specifically the rise of a 
large number of research universities in the post-war period.  Though Volcker had long 
spells in government service, and in recent years Fischer has worked in the private sector, 
scientific economics is a university discipline, and is not simply something that, because 
of its public policy importance, is merely taught within universities.  This of course 
reflects a change from earlier times.  For what these conversations record are the careers 
of individuals who have made contributions to economic research and that research is the 
coin of the realm in particular academic communities.  Teaching, mentoring graduate 
students, and developing new economic analyses for emerging economic problems are by 
and large activities that are carried out in universities, not in think tanks, and not in 
government agencies.   
 
Yet another feature of these conversations that would interest historians is that 
while research in economics is carried on in universities, much of this research engages a 
larger public through the efforts of these very same researchers.  It is as if the nuclear 
physicists took their concerns, at the same time they were scientifically active, to larger 
public discussions.  Here particularly one needs to take note of the work done by Martin 
Feldstein at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and Paul Volcker in his many 
roles both in and outside of government.  Kornai as well has important stories to tell 
about the connection between economics and politics, stories that are increasingly 
recognizable as it is understood by historians that the history of economics is not simply a 
recounting of how great ideas came to be understood and developed and promulgated, but 
how ideas moved across the boundaries of tightly organized professional communities 
into the larger community interested in economics.  This is a story of the increasing 
importance of economists in public life, a process that was heavily influenced by 
Roosevelt’s years and moved quickly in the 1940s with the creation of the Council of 
Economic Advisors following on the Employment Act of 1946.  Historians have begun to 
                                                 
11 I note, from the Samuelson interview, his particular connection to the Bush report. 
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themselves, but it is a history of the import and impact of ideas (see Bernstein 2001).   
 
In this passage of ideas, what is termed the transmission of economic knowledge, it 
is not only government and the military who are the receivers.  There are as well large 
numbers of foundations which have helped to support economics and economic research 
for particular purposes of their own, over a long period of time.  The story of the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s support of business cycle research internationally in the inter-
war period is well known, and of course much of the modern work on business cycles, 
and indeed econometric models, dates from those years.  The Volker Fund (not 
associated with Paul Volcker) in the 1940s supported the reconstruction of the University 
of Chicago Economics Department and helped Capitalism and Freedom’s author publish 
that volume; moreover it provided the funding/impetus for Hayek’s position at Chicago.  
All of which is a way of noting that economists’s ideas ramify:  as Keynes famously 
remarked, “indeed, the world is ruled by little else” (Keynes 1936, 383). And thus any 
enhanced understanding of the genesis of economists’s ideas, as may be gleaned from the 
set of interviews collected here, should serve to make our world more comprehensible. 
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